#### FILED Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich 1 6241 Freedom Lane FEB 0 4 7920 Citrus Heights, CA 95621 3 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (916) 334-1413 4 DEPUTY CLE ryanse@gmail.com 5 Plaintiff in Pro Per 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 for the 9 Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division 10 11 12 **Plaintiff** 13 Case No.: 2:20-cv-02422-JAM-CKD (PS) Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich Plaintiff's OBJECTIONS TO 14 MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS VS. Defendant 15 Hearing Date: Time: Alex Padilla, in his official capacity Judge: John A. Mendez as Secretary of State for the State of Courtroom: 16 California 17 TABLE OF CONTENTS 18 I. INTRODUCTION.......2 19 20 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW......8 III. SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO MAJISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS ......9 21 IIIa. State Regulation of Elections......10 22 23

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13	I. INTRODUCTION	
14	While he thanks Magistrate Judge for granting him in forma pauperis sta	itus
15	(aka IFP status), Plaintiff Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich does hereby register	ſ
16	his objections to Magistrate Judge Carolyn K. Delaney's document titled	
17	"ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS", which was filed	on
18	January 25, 2021.	
19	In providing his objections in this document, Plaintiff identifies many flaw	s
20	in Magistrate Judge's analysis and registers many detailed objections to	
21	Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations, offering additional	
22	exhibits in support of Plaintiff's position where useful. However, there is	one
23	specific finding that Plaintiff must address upfront, as it is the main ration	ale

- that Magistrate Judge provides for her recommendation to dismiss and
- 2 close this Case.
- 3 Plaintiff notes that Magistrate Judge finds that his Case fails as a matter of
- 4 law because the burdens imposed by California Elections Code §§ 8600-
- 5 8606 and 8650-8653 are not severe and so the balance of interests favor
- 6 the State of California. To support this assertion, Magistrate Judge offers
- 7 precedents that support the constitutionality of state requirements for a
- 8 reasonable number of signatures from registered voters for a given
- 9 candidate to be placed on the ballot. She asserts that, as the State of
- 10 California only requires Write-In Candidates to produce fifty-five (55)
- signatures, this requirement should be construed as less burdensome, and
- so constitutional, under those precedents.
- Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge's analysis, as her analogies are fatally
- 14 flawed in two regards. First, her analogy fails to acknowledge that simple
- signatures are not sufficient for Write-In Candidates, as they must produce
- 16 fifty-five NOTARIZED sworn oaths. Second, her analogy fails to
- acknowledge the difference between ballot placement requirements, which
- are applied PRIOR to ballots being issued, and Write-In Voting
- 19 requirements, which are applied AFTER ballots have ALREADY BEEN

- 1 CAST in determining whether or not to actually count and report individual
- 2 Write-In Votes.
- 3 Magistrate Judge errs in equating signature gathering requirements with
- 4 the State of California's requirements for Write-In Candidates, as the State
- requires each Presidential Write-In Ticket to produce fifty-five (55)
- 6 NOTARIZED sworn oaths from electors (see Declaration of Write-In
- 7 Candidacy forms in Exhibit F). Notarization requires a per-signature fee
- and cannot be accomplished without the presence of the notary at the time
- 9 the signature is actually rendered. As such, notarization presents severe
- monetary and logistical burdens. Notarization requires significant monetary
- expenditure and detailed coordination with the electors so that they arrive
- at the notary's office on the correct time and date, so that the notary can
- witness the signature at the same time as the candidate pays the
- notarization fee. This burden is far more substantial and severe than the
- burden imposed by ballot placement schemes that require simple
- signatures from registered voters, which can be obtained on-the-spot,
- without the presence of a notary.
- To expand upon this point as it relates to Plaintiff's Case, Magistrate Judge
- 19 fails to acknowledge that the State of California's notarization requirement

- presents a severe monetary burden to Plaintiff. For the year 2020, the
- standard per-signature notary fee in the State of California was \$15 (see
- 3 Exhibit BB). Based on this estimate, the minimum amount that must be
- 4 spent on notarization for Plaintiff to meet the State of California's
- requirement would be  $55 \times 15 = 825$ . Notably, this amount alone is
- 6 roughly double the \$402 cost of filing a Case in Federal District Court.
- 7 Additionally, this amount does not include the travel related costs
- 8 necessary for the relevant parties to arrive on-time in-person at the notary's
- office and also does not include the opportunity cost (easily at least one
- hour) born by the elector. Furthermore, the travel and opportunity cost born
- by the elector disincentive potential electors from participating in this
- activity unless paid (or reimbursed) for doing so.
- In granting IFP status to Plaintiff for this Case, Magistrate Judge recognizes
- that the Court's filing fee presents an unbearable financial burden to
- Plaintiff. Simply put, an unbearable financial burden must also be construed
- as severe. So Magistrate Judge should have found that the State of
- 17 California's implicit filing fee of at least \$825 for Write-In Candidates is even
- more unbearable and severe.

- 1 Additionally, the Court held in Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board
- of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989) that filing fee requirements
- 3 for Write-In Candidates violate First Amendment rights to free expression
- 4 and association, as they close off necessary avenues for dissident
- 5 expression, and are therefore unconstitutional. As no decision have ever
- 6 overturned this precedent, the Court should recognize that the State of
- 7 California's requirement for fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths
- 8 presents an implicit filing fee of at least \$825 (which is much greater than
- 9 the \$150 filing fee relevant to the Dixon case), and is therefore
- 10 unconstitutional.
- Also, Magistrate Judge incorrectly applies Plaintiff's refusal to provide the
- State's required NOTARIZED sworn oaths as evidence that Plaintiff made
- no effort to try to obtain said NOTARIZED sworn oaths. Plaintiff includes
- evidence in Exhibits BC and BD below that Plaintiff did in fact attempt to
- use Social Media to find fifty-five (55) electors to provide NOTARIZED
- sworn oaths, but this result yielded no results. Additionally, Plaintiff
- provides Exhibits BE through BH below as evidence that Plaintiff's Social
- 18 Media posts may have been actively suppressed during the course of the
- 2020 Election, as Plaintiff describes in greater detail later in this document.
- 20 Plaintiff proposes that such possible suppression may have been in

- response to the potentially inflammatory nature of his primary campaign
- 2 message that "AFDC create the Middle Class" and his efforts to repeal the
- 3 1996 Welfare Reform. Notably, these aspects of his Campaign provide
- 4 direct grounds for the Court to exercise Strict Scrutiny in this Case.
- 5 Furthermore, in citing decisions that support signature requirements as part
- of a State's ballot placement scheme, Magistrate Judge additionally errs in
- analogizing between requirements for ballot placement (i.e. printing a given
- 8 Candidate's name on the ballot BEFORE voting occurs) and requirements
- 9 for counting and reporting Write-In Votes, as said Write-In Votes have
- 10 ALREADY BEEN CAST by Voters by the time the State applies these
- Write-In requirements to individual Write-In Votes. In the former (i.e. ballot
- placement), the Candidate's actions in meeting the signature requirements
- or not control whether the Voter sees said Candidate's name listed on the
- ballot. However, in the latter (i.e. Write-In Voting), the Voter is the one who,
- in choosing whether or not to cast a Write-In Vote for said Candidate,
- decides whether or not to enter the Candidate's name directly on the ballot
- in the space provided for the Write-In Option. Upon the Voter choosing to
- write a Candidate's name on said ballot, the Voter has ALREADY CAST a
- Write-In Vote for said Candidate. As such, the Voters' interests in having
- their Write-In Votes counted and reported must be included in the balance

- of interests against the State. In this scenario, the correct precedent to
- apply is the Bush v. Gore Uniformity Principle, which prohibits unequal
- treatment of Votes cast in the same elections. As the Write-In Vote has
- 4 ALREADY BEEN CAST at the time of counting and reporting, under this
- 5 Uniformity Principle, this Write-In Vote MUST then be counted and
- 6 reported, just as a Vote for a ballot-listed Candidate would be counted and
- 7 reported.
- 8 As remedy for Magistrate Judge's flawed analysis in providing her findings
- and recommendations, Plaintiff does hereby propose that the Court
- disregard Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations and direct
- Plaintiff to perform service of his original Complaint upon the Defendant.
- 12 Below, Plaintiff offers additional detailed objections and support for his
- proposed remedy.

### 14 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

- 15 This Court's standard of review is de novo, as stated under 28 U.S.C. §
- 636(b)(1)(C): "A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of
- those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
- recommendations to which objection is made."

- Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the Court must apply Strict Scrutiny in
- 2 reviewing this Case, as he explains in Sections IIIe below.

### 3 III. SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS

- 4 In articulating her recommendation to CLOSE and DISMISS this Case with
- 5 Prejudice, Magistrate Judge puts forth the following arguments as to why
- she believes Plaintiff's Case fails as a matter of law:
- 1) That Courts have granted States wide latitude to regulate their own
   elections
- 2) That no bright line separates permissible election regulation from
   Constitutional Infringement
- 3) That the burden on the Plaintiff's rights is not severe or discriminatory
- 12 4) That the balance of interests favor the State
- 5) That Strict Scrutiny is not warranted in this Case
- 14 6) That Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or the claim is not redressable
- Plaintiff does now object to these findings and does now answer these
- arguments with his detailed rationale below.

# 1 Illa. State Regulation of Elections

- 2 As Magistrate Judge notes in her citations of precedents, Courts have
- 3 generally ruled that States should be granted wide latitude in regulating
- 4 political party nominating processes and ballot access requirements.
- 5 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has established a precedent that States
- should be able to choose whether or not to allow Voters to cast Write-In
- 7 Votes in elections.
- 8 However, Plaintiff objects to the application of these precedents to this
- 9 specific Case, as the matters decided in these precedents are NOT
- relevant to and do not answer the questions raised in this Case. Simply put,
- these are the wrong precedents to apply to this Case, as Plaintiff has never
- sought placement on ballots in the State of California, the election in
- question was a General Election not a Primary Election, and the State of
- 14 California has already previously decided to allow Voters to cast Write-In
- 15 Votes.
- The questions needing decision in this case are wholly different:
- 1) Is the State obligated to count and report ALL Write-In Votes that

  have ALREADY BEEN CAST?

- 2) Should the State be prohibited from imposing implicit filing fees for Write-In Candidates by requiring fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths?
- 3) Should the State be required to warn Voters of statutory restrictions
   on Write-In Voting in ballot-level instructions PRIOR to discarding
   ALREADY CAST Write-In Votes?
- On all of these questions, the entire body of precedents that Plaintiff is
- 8 aware of supports Plaintiff's assertion that the answer to these questions
- 9 should be decided in Plaintiff's favor.
- 10 On the first question of the State's obligation to count and report ALL Write-
- In Votes, the Bush v. Gore Uniformity Principle clearly supports Plaintiff's
- assertion that upon the State of California granting Voters the means to
- cast Write-In Votes and upon a Voter exercising that State-provided means
- to cast a Write-In Vote, the State is then subsequently obligated under the
- Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law to treat any
- such ALREADY CAST Write-In Votes equally to how they would treat
- 17 Votes cast for any other Candidates in that specific election. This obligation
- is established in Supreme Court precedent as a prohibition on unequal
- 19 treatment of votes, as the Court states:

The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise.

2 Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once

granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and

disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." See Bush v.

5 Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

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- 6 Additionally, on the first question, the decision in Dixon v. Maryland State
- 7 Administrative Board of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989)
- 8 provides unequivocal support for the First Amendment obligation to count
- 9 and report ALL Write-In Votes that have ALREADY BEEN CAST using
- State-provided means to do so, regardless of whether any specific
- 11 Candidate that Voters choose to Write-In meets the States requirements to
- become a Certified Write-In Candidate. Specifically, the Court states:

"Maryland's refusal publicly to announce the vote totals of non-certified write-in candidates squarely implicates these concerns. For, almost invariably, those who cast write-in votes are expressing support for persons other than major party candidates, whose names normally appear on the ballot. Indeed, in many cases write-in voters may be backing persons who are not even running for office, in effect expressing the comment 'A plague o' both your houses.' Such dissident voters are no doubt aware that, as efforts to achieve the actual election of their favorites, their votes probably will be without effect. Nonetheless, these voters cast their ballots as they do, in the hope, however slim, that their votes will

- succeed as efforts to propagate their views, and so increase their influence. Our system of government accords the expression of this hope the status of a protected right." See Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989).
- In ignoring the States obligation to count and report ALREADY CAST
- 6 Write-In Votes, Magistrate Judge incorrectly cites Burdick v. Takushi, 937
- F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1991) as support for doing so. However, Magistrate
- 8 Judge fails to recognize that the question decided in the Burdick case was
- 9 whether or not a State is obligated to provide Voters the means to cast
- Write-In Votes. As the State of California has already decided to do so and
- did so in the 2020 General Election, the decision in the Burdick case should
- have no bearing on the result of Plaintiff's Case. In further support of the
- irrelevance of the Burdick case, Plaintiff asks the Court to review Exhibit H
- 14 for proof that the State of California HAS ALREADY CHOSEN to allow
- Write-In Voting and Exhibit BI for proof that the State of Hawaii HAS NOT
- 16 CHOSEN to allow Write-In Voting.
- Also, on the first question, in defining the words "vote" and "voting" under
- 18 U.S. Law, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 §
- 13(c)(1) places equal importance on the act of the Voter casting the ballot
- 20 as it does on the State counting and reporting said ballot in the overall

- result, specifically stating: "The terms 'vote' or 'voting' shall include all
- action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or
- 3 general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to
- 4 this Act, or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a
- 5 ballot, and having such ballot counted properly and included in the
- 6 appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public or
- party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election".
- 8 So by failing to count and report Plaintiff's Write-In Vote for his own
- 9 Candidacy, the State of California has effectively DENIED Plaintiff the
- 10 RIGHT to VOTE.
- Additionally, on the first question, the Court has affirmed the State's
- obligation to count and report Votes where the intent of the Voter can
- clearly be determined. In Hendon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections,
- 14 633 F. Supp. 454 (W.D.N.C. 1986), not only was this standard upheld, but
- the Court went so far as to invalidate North Carolina state-level statutes
- that intended to circumvent the clear intent of Voters and mandated the
- 17 reprogramming to various models of voting machines to honor the true
- intent of Voters.

- Furthermore, on this point, Plaintiff stipulates that the intent that he
- 2 expressed in his Write-In Vote for his own Candidacy in the 2020 U.S.
- 3 General Election was perfectly clear, absolutely meeting this standard for
- 4 clear Voter intent, by virtue of the fact that he:
- 1) Wrote his own name, Ryan Ehrenreich, for the office of President in the space provided on his Sacramento Counting Official Ballot for casting a Write-In Vote in the Presidential Contest,
- 2) Wrote his running mate's name, Veronica Ehrenreich, for the office
   of Vice President in the aforementioned space,
  - 3) Did fill-in the oval next to the space provided to cast a Write-In a Vote for the Offices of President and Vice President, and
  - Did NOT mark any other oval for any other option in the contest for President and Vice President.
- On the second question of whether the State of California should be
- prohibited from imposing implicit filing fees on Write-In Candidates via
- NOTARIZATION requirements, Plaintiff offers in support of such prohibition
- that the decision in Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board of
- 18 Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989) prohibits States from requiring
- 19 filing fees from Write-In Candidates. In asserting that the State of

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- 1 California's requirement for fifty-five (55) notarized signatures from electors
- is an implicit filing fee that presents a severe burden to Write-In
- 3 Candidates, Plaintiff notes that the minimum cost of meeting this implicit
- filing fee would be  $15 \times 55 = 825$ , whereas the filing fee in question in the
- 5 Dixon case was only \$150. On this matter, Magistrate Judge references
- 6 Plaintiff's refusal to meet this requirement, as if Plaintiff's unwillingness is
- evidence of a lack of burden. But as Plaintiff is filing this Case in Forma
- 8 Pauperis (IFP), Plaintiff's refusal to comply with this statutory requirement
- 9 is actually proof of his good sense and judgement. Also, Plaintiff shows in
- 10 Exhibits BC and BD that he made efforts via Social Media to meet this
- requirement, but could not find any potential electors willing to fulfill the
- 12 State's requirement for NOTARIZED sworn oaths.
- On the third question of whether the State should be required to warn
- 14 Voters in ballot-level instructions prior to discarding ALREADY CAST Write-
- In Votes, Plaintiff notes that the instructions provided to him on his
- Sacramento County Official Ballot (see Exhibit H of Plaintiff's original
- 17 Complaint) were "To vote for a qualified write-in candidate, write name of
- the candidate in the space provided AND fill in the oval next to your choice
- 19 ... These instructions FAILED to mention the term "Certified Write-In
- 20 Candidate", the existence of California Elections Code §§ 8600-8606 and

- 1 8650-8653, or any the means by which a Voter can access the State's
- official list of Certified Write-In Candidates. Under these instructions, the
- 3 State of California clearly shirked its obligations under the Duty to Warn
- 4 Principle to warn voters of material information that would affect the
- 5 counting and reporting of their Write-In Votes.
- In addition to the Duty to Warn Principle, the Court has found that not only
- 7 must clear instructions be included with a Voters ballot, but furthermore, a
- 8 failure to provide such instructions provides grounds for invalidating an
- election. Particularly, in Dole v. Local Union 317, 711 F. Supp. 577 (M.D.
- Ala. 1989), the Court found that because Local Union 317 did NOT mail the
- instructions for the ballot with the actual ballot, that the union violated the
- required safeguards for ensuring a fair election. As part of the remedy for
- this case, the Court invalidated the election in question, declaring it null and
- void, and mandated a new election be held. By not informing Voters of the
- 15 State's intended meaning of "qualified write-in candidate", the existence of
- and means for accessing the State's list of Certified Write-In Candidates, or
- the implications of California Elections Code §§ 8600-8606 and 8650-8653
- on a Voter's Write-In Vote, the State of California failed to provide proper
- instructions with the Official State Ballots and so provides grounds for the

- 1 Court to invalidate the State's certified election results for the 2020 General
- 2 Election.
- 3 So even if the statutes in question, California Elections Code §§ 8600-8606
- and 8650-8653, were Constitutional (which Plaintiff has asserted above is
- 5 not so), the State's application of these statutes would NOT be. As Plaintiff
- 6 was "qualified" under the U.S. Constitution to run for the office of President
- and his running mate was equally qualified to run for the office of Vice
- 8 President, in voting for his own ticket, he did perfectly fulfill the
- 9 requirements laid out in the instructions provided to him at the time he cast
- his Vote, as did any other Voter who chose to cast a Vote for his
- 11 Candidacy. To not count and report his Vote, or any other Vote for his
- 12 Candidacy, clearly runs afoul of the Bush v. Gore Uniformity Principle, as
- well as other legal precedents previously explained above.
- Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that it is IMPOSSIBLE for the State of
- 15 California to produce a Constitutional process by which it could implement
- the statutes in question. This is so because the Due Process and Equal
- 17 Protection rights granted under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
- guarantee Voters that the State shall not arbitrarily and unfairly discard the

- Votes of one type of Voter, while faithfully counting and reporting the Votes
- of another type of Voter.
- In the matter of Voting Rights, this guarantee against such arbitrary and
- 4 unfair action on the part of the State is further explicitly enshrined in the
- 5 prohibition on Literacy Tests included in the Voting Rights Act Amendments
- of 1970, Pub. L. 91–285, 84 Stat. 314 § 201(b), which defines a Literacy
- 7 Test as "any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting [...]
- 8 demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter"
- 9 where the Court should apply the definition of the word "voting" provided in
- the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which places equal important on the casting
- of a Vote as it does on the counting and reporting of said Vote. Based on
- this definition, the Court must construe that the State of California's
- requirement for Write-In Candidates to produce fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED
- sworn oaths, as well as the State's enforcement of this requirement,
- present a Literacy Test to Voters who choose to cast Write-In Votes, and
- so the statutes codifying this requirement must be found to be
- 17 unconstitutional.
- Furthermore, to rectify the deficiencies of the existing ballot instructions, the
- State of California might propose to: 1) alert Voters to the existence of the

- statutes in question, 2) provide a written list of Certified Write-In
- 2 Candidates, and 3) inform Voters of how to access this list. But Plaintiff
- 3 asserts that for a Voter to adhere to these updated instructions, the Voter
- 4 still must have the ability to read and understand this detailed information.
- 5 Given this requirement, any update to the ballot instructions or other state-
- 6 provided election materials to rectify this deficiency would qualify as a
- 7 Literacy Test, and so also be Unconstitutional.
- 8 IIIb. Existence of a bright line for Unconstitutionality
- 9 In her findings and recommendations, Magistrate Judge explicitly states:
- 10 "[N]o bright line separates permissible election-related regulation from
- unconstitutional infringements," and courts are required to make "hard
- judgments" given the interests involved. Rubin, 308 F.3d at 1014.
- Plaintiff asserts that this statement is based on Magistrate Judge's
- application of irrelevant and outdated Case Law.
- Plaintiff notes that, while there may not be a "bright line" that determines
- when an election-related regulation IS Constitutional, there is definitely AT
- 17 LEAST ONE "bright line" that determines when an election-related
- regulation IS NOT Constitutional (or is Unconstitutional). This "bright line"

- on Unconstitutionality that Plaintiff references is established in the Bush v.
- 2 Gore Uniformity Principle.
- 3 The Bush v. Gore Uniformity Principle provides a "bright line" by prohibiting
- 4 unequal treatment of Votes cast in the same election on the grounds that
- such unequal treatment is Unconstitutional. The "bright line" itself is
- 6 whether any two different Votes cast in the same election are treated
- 7 equally or not. As Plaintiff cast his Write-In Vote using state-provided
- means and in accordance with the instructions provided to him at the time
- of voting, the Court must apply this "bright line" to Plaintiff's Case, as his
- Write-In Vote was ALREADY CAST using State-provided means at the
- time the State of California chose to exclude it from the counting and
- 12 reporting processes.
- In applying this "bright line", the Court must find that Plaintiff's Write-In Vote
- was clearly treated unequally to Votes cast for Ballot-listed Candidates in
- State of California during the 2020 General Election. Furthermore, in
- applying the definition of "vote" provided in the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
- which places equal important of the casting of a vote as it does on the
- counting and reporting of said vote, the Court must find that Plaintiff was
- denied his Right to Vote in the 2020 General Election.

### 1 Illc. Severity of Plaintiff's Burden

- 2 In finding that the burden placed upon Plaintiff by California Elections Code
- 3 §§ 8600-8606 and 8650-8653 are NOT severe, Magistrate Judge fails to
- 4 take into account three key considerations:
- 1) Generally, the high monetary cost (at least \$825) and logistical burdens (coordinating in-person notarization) required to obtain fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths;
  - As a Candidate, the unique aspects of Plaintiff's Candidacy that make this burden particularly severe to him, as explained below;
     and
  - 3) As a Voter, the expectations that the State of California places upon Plaintiff (and other Voters) to know that the statutes in question even exist.
- In terms of the first consideration, the high monetary cost and logistical
  burden imposed on Write-In Candidates by the State of California's
  requirement for fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths, the Plaintiff has
  already explained this consideration above in this document. So for brevity,
  Plaintiff reasserts here that any comparison between this requirement and
  simple signature requirements for ballot placement is so erroneous and

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- 1 flawed that the Court must find such an analogy to be useless in
- determining the severity of Plaintiff's burden in this Case.
- 3 In terms of the second consideration, the uniqueness of his Candidacy and
- 4 his controversial Campaign platform make this burden particularly severe to
- 5 him specifically. In deciding the severity of the burden to Plaintiff, Plaintiff
- asks the Court to consider his main Campaign message that Aid to
- 7 Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) created the Middle Class by
- 8 enacting an implicit Price Support for Labor, that the 1996 Welfare Reform
- 9 is responsible for the current economic destabilization of American society,
- and that the 1996 Welfare Reform should be repealed and replaced with a
- modern Price Support for Labor. Additionally, Plaintiff advocates for the
- United States leading an effort to create a Price Support for Labor within
- every country in the world.
- 14 The specific content of Plaintiff's Campaign warrants that the Court find a
- uniquely severe burden exists where a lesser burden might normally exist
- for other Candidates. Due to his controversial Campaign platform, for his
- personal safety, Plaintiff has sought to minimize his interpersonal activity
- outside the home. In such a situation, the requirement for Plaintiff to
- 19 produce fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths from electors is

- unreasonable for him to meet, as it places an extremely severe burden on
- him by requiring him to prioritize fulfilling said requirement over his prudent
- 3 efforts to ensure his own personal safety.
- 4 Additionally, as part of his effort to minimize his interpersonal activity
- outside the home, Plaintiff instead posted to Twitter on a frequent, near
- 6 daily basis (and to Facebook and Reddit less often), in the hopes that he
- 7 could use Social Media to virtually build his political constituency. However,
- 8 based on the potentially inflammatory nature of his main campaign
- 9 message described above, Plaintiff suspects that his Social Media
- accounts were sandboxed, that interactions with other users were
- intercepted, and that his posts were suppressed from other users'
- newsfeeds and search results as part of an orchestrated effort to prevent
- him from spreading this message. While it is impossible for Plaintiff to
- definitively prove that this sandboxing and suppression occurred, he does
- provide his best evidence in Exhibits BE through BH, which show that his
- Reddit posts appear to him as successfully posted when viewed while
- logged-in under his own account, but that these same posts appear as
- removed by Moderators when viewed publicly.

- Additionally, contrary to Magistrate Judge's implication that Plaintiff did not
- try to meet the State of California's requirement for fifty-five (55) notarized
- 3 sworn electors, Plaintiff did try to use Twitter and Facebook to find fifty-five
- 4 (55) volunteers to fulfill the State's requirement for his Write-In Campaign.
- 5 However, his posts shown in Exhibits BC and BD did not generate any
- 6 response from other users. At this point, based on the likelihood that his
- 7 Social Media posts might have been suppressed, Plaintiff determined that it
- was his best course of action to refuse to meet the State of California's
- 9 requirement for fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths.
- 10 In terms of the third question, Plaintiff's role as a Voter and as an advocate
- for the class of Voters that share his interest in casting Write-In Votes for
- 12 Candidates of their choosing, Plaintiff request that the Court recognize that
- the burden on such Write-In Voters in extraordinarily high.
- Surely, there are many Voters in the State of California who read the
- instruction on their ballot, then, and thinking they are allowed to cast a
- Write-In Vote for whomever they want, subsequently cast a Write-In Vote
- for an uncertified Candidate. It is especially likely that poor, less educated
- Voters choose to exercise this manner of Voting, as they are most likely to

- feel disaffected by both major political parties, which are heavily influenced
- 2 by big-money interests.
- 3 As Plaintiff understands the results reported in Exhibit M of his original
- 4 Complaint, out of 883,549 ballots cast in Sacramento County, 729,569
- included a Vote in the U.S. Presidential Race. Of those 729,569 Votes,
- 6 10,536 Votes (or 1.4%) were classified as "Undervotes". How is it possible
- 7 for a Vote to be cast in a single-selection Contest, but still be classified as
- an "Undervote"? Plaintiff believes that this occurs when the Voter casts a
- 9 Write-In Vote for a non-Certified Write-In Candidate.
- 10 Based on this analysis, as well as arguments presented above, Plaintiff
- asserts that it is highly likely that 1.4% of Voters in Sacramento County
- were denied the Right to Vote in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election
- because: 1) they were unaware of California Elections Code §§ 8600-8606
- and 8650-8653, 2) the State of California did not educate them on these
- statutes, 3) the State of California chose to enforce these statutes in spite
- of not educating Voters on their existence, and/or 4) even if Voters were
- aware of the statutes, they might Vote as they wish anyways because they
- believe these statutes to be Unconstitutional.

- 1 Plaintiff asserts that the State of California using these statutes as grounds
- to summarily discard 1.4% of Votes cast in the 2020 U.S. Presidential
- 3 Election in any specific County inflicts an extremely high burden on Voters.
- 4 Plaintiff notes that the Court may find it useful to order Defendant to
- 5 produce an explanation on this matter.

# 6 IIId. Determining the Balance of Interests

- 7 In determining that the balance of interests favors the state, Magistrate
- 8 Judge has offered as support many irrelevant or loosely relevant
- 9 precedents and has failed to accurately address the specifics of this Case.
- 10 The main precedent that Magistrate Judge cites in making her
- determination is Blankenship v. Newsom, No. 20-CV-04479-RS, 2020 WL
- 12 6589654, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2020), which supports the State's
- authority to require signatures for Candidates to appear on the State's
- ballot. But Plaintiff has already stipulated that he has NOT sought ballot
- placement.
- Instead, Plaintiff as explained that in matters of Write-In Voting, it is the
- 17 Voters themselves who place a Candidate's name on the ballot, as is their
- 18 Constitutional right to do so. Or put another way, if Voters choose to cast
- Write-In Votes for Plaintiff, why should the State be allowed to require

- 1 Plaintiff to find those people in advance of the election and require them to
- 2 spend hours of time and Plaintiff to spend hundreds, if not thousands, of
- 3 dollars producing notarized sworn statements? Plaintiff asserts that if the
- 4 Court allows such a severe burden on Write-In Candidates to stand, the
- 5 Court would be supporting the suppression of the clear intent of Voters to
- the benefit of the political establishment, thus severely restricting which
- 7 Candidates are allowed to viably compete in California elections.
- 8 Furthermore, based on the severe monetary, unreasonable monetary
- 9 burden imposed by the State's requirements for Write-In Candidates, the
- state must construe that these requirements actively discriminate against
- both Poor Candidates and Poor Votes. This discrimination severely
- precludes the possibility of Poor Candidates who represent the interest of
- Poor Voters (as well as Poor People in general) from succeeding in the
- 14 California election process.
- Plaintiff requests that the Court incorporate the arguments and information
- presented above when making a final determination of the balance of
- interests necessary to determine the outcome of this Case.

# 1 Ille. Rationale for Strict Scrutiny

- 2 Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff's Case does not deserve Strict Scrutiny
- 3 based on the general subject matter of the Case, namely Election Law.
- 4 However Plaintiff has shown that the State of California's requirement that
- 5 Write-In Candidates product fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths from
- 6 electors is severely burdensome and highly discriminatory to Poor
- 7 Candidates and Poor Votes, warranting heightened scrutiny from the Court.
- 8 Additionally, in requesting that the Court apply Strict Scrutiny to this case,
- 9 Plaintiff does so based on the uniqueness of his Candidacy, which focused
- on the message that "AFDC created the Middle Class". Specifically,
- Plaintiff's efforts to repeal the 1996 Welfare Reform as undesirable
- legislation unfairly targeting Poor People, who are themselves a discrete
- and insular minority, provide the exact type of justification for applying Strict
- Scrutiny that was articulated in the famous Footnote 4 of United States v.
- 15 Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which first established
- the rationale for Strict Scrutiny.
- To further elucidate, Plaintiff is a Candidate whose main campaign
- message is that the Social Security Act of 1935 created the historically
- strong U.S. Middle Class by enacting an implicit Price Support for Labor

- that absorbed the excess Supply of Labor, which was caused by advances
- in Technology and Automation, by paying some adults NOT to work.
- In this message, Plaintiff asserts that Aid to Dependent Children (ADC),
- 4 later renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), was the
- 5 most critical component of this Price Support for Labor, as AFDC was the
- 6 only government program that absorbed the excess supply of able-bodied,
- 7 working-age adults by paying the subset of these adults who were single
- and had children to NOT work and to stay poor.
- 9 Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that the Personal Responsibility and Work
- Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWORA), colloquially known as the 1996
- Welfare Reform, broke the U.S. Price Support for Labor by replacing AFDC
- with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which is incapable
- of serving as a Price Support due to its work requirements, time limits, and
- harsh enforcement mechanisms. Plaintiff asserts that this is why the U.S.
- has experienced an ever-weakening Middle Class and ever-more-
- unpredictable economy since PRWORA's passage.
- 17 Plaintiff consistently campaigned on the promise to repeal this undesirable
- legislation and replace it with a system that restores the U.S. Price Support
- 19 for Labor. Plaintiff publicly Tweeted this message to various News Outlets

- and Elected Officials over Twitter, but his efforts were ignored, and possibly
- 2 suppressed. Due to this situation, Plaintiff asserts that his U.S. Presidential
- 3 Campaign has been suppressed in traditional political processes.
- 4 Under United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
- 5 Plaintiff asserts that Write-In Vote Exclusion Statutes "restrict those political
- 6 processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
- 7 undesirable legislation", where the "undesirable legislation" is PRWORA.
- 8 Also under United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144
- 9 (1938), Plaintiff asserts that Poor People qualify as a "discrete and insular
- minority", as they lack the means to participate in or influence political
- processes. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that, as Write-In Voting provides
- the only possible path to victory for Plaintiff's Candidacy, Write-In Vote
- Exclusion Statutes serve "to curtail the operation of those political
- processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."
- For these reasons, as well as others previously asserted in this document
- and Plaintiff's original Complaint, including but not limited to, violations of
- U.S. Voting Rights Law and possible violations of said Law on the basis of
- Protected Group (see Plaintiff's Requested Relief), Plaintiff asserts that this
- 19 Case deserves Strict Scrutiny.

# 1 IIIf. Validity of Claim as Stated

- 2 Magistrate Judge has implied that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim and
- that Plaintiff's claim is not redressable by the Court. Plaintiff asserts that
- 4 these implications clearly lack validity.
- 5 Rather, Plaintiff has offered the Court a detailed description of a clear
- 6 Controversy. After refusing to meet the State of California's requirement for
- 7 fifty-five (55) notarized sworn elector oaths, Plaintiff asked Defendant's
- 8 functionaries multiple times to count and report Write-In Votes for his
- 9 Candidacy on the grounds that said requirement is unconstitutional.
- Defendant's functionaries declined to do so and did not count or report
- 11 Write-In Votes for Plaintiff's Candidacy.
- 12 To redress this matter, Plaintiff has requested that the Court find that
- California Elections Code §§ 8600-8606 and 8650-8653, as well as similar
- state-level statutes, are unconstitutional and ORDER the State of California
- to count and report Write-In Votes for Plaintiff's Candidacy.
- 16 Court precedents support that claims such as Plaintiff's claim are both valid
- and redressable. Particularly, Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board
- of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989) addresses a claim that is
- quite similar to Plaintiff's in structure and content, and the Court responded

- by issuing a clear decision and ordering the counting and reporting of
- 2 Write-In Votes.

### 3 IV. LINE-LEVEL OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS

- 4 In addition to Plaintiff's aforementioned objections to Magistrate Judge's
- 5 findings and recommendations for Plaintiff's Case, Plaintiff also adds the
- 6 following line-level objections.
- 7 On page 1, lines 24 to 27, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge listing
- 8 conditions warranting dismissal that are irrelevant to Plaintiff's case,
- 9 especially in regard to conditions about frivolity, maliciousness, and
- monetary relief. Clearly, Plaintiff's Case is not frivolous, not malicious, and
- Plaintiff has NOT sought any monetary relief. Plaintiff asserts that listing
- such conditions serves no compelling purpose, but only serves to build bias
- against him and his Case.
- On page 3, lines 4 to 15, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge
- characterizing his actions as "requesting special treatment under the law"
- and "threaten[ing] costly litigation". Plaintiff notes that in the Court's Local
- 17 Rules, Conference of Counsel is a common prerequisite for the Court
- considering Motions. This type of effort toward proactive dispute resolution
- is exactly what Plaintiff intended to accomplish in his letter to Defendant.

- 1 This is extremely prudent, given the nature of Plaintiff's Case, as the
- 2 possibility of resolving disputes proactively only existed PRIOR to the State
- of California certifying election results. Now that the State has already
- 4 certified results, only a decision from the Court can provide Plaintiff with the
- 5 necessary and warranted relief in this Case.
- 6 On page 4, lines 5 to 10, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge's finding that
- 7 Plaintiff's Case fails as a matter of law, as Plaintiff has offered a multitude
- 8 of reasons why Magistrate Judge's supporting analysis is faulty and
- 9 inaccurate. In support of this objection, Plaintiff reiterates Magistrate
- Judge's errors of analysis previously described in this document, including
- that Magistrate Judge:

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- Fails to include Plaintiff's role as a Voter and as an advocate for the entire class of Write-In Voters in determining the balance of interests in this Case;
- Offers a faulty analogy between signature requirements for ballot placement and requirements for NOTARIZED sworn oaths for Write-In Candidates;
- 3) Offers a faulty analogy between ballot placement, which occurs prior to voting, and Write-In Voting, which is decided by the Voter

at the time of voting, and so yields ALREADY CAST Write-In 1 Votes, which the State of California chooses to subsequently 2 summarily and arbitrarily discard; 3

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- 4) Incorrectly finds that the burden of acquiring fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths from electors is not severe for Plaintiff. even though the amount of money required to fulfill this requirement is at least twice the amount of the District Court filing fee, which Magistrate Judge waives as unbearable for Plaintiff in granting him IFP status; and
- 5) Incorrectly finds that Plaintiff did not make an effort to fulfill this requirement, as he clearly did so, as shown in Exhibits BC through BH, but upon his attempts not producing results for reasons outside of his control (including possible suppression of his Social Media posts), he committed to prosecuting the unconstitutionality of this requirement.
- On page 4, lines 11 to 23, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge's analysis in 16 describing the legal standard for challenges to state election laws on the grounds that her description is not accurate for this Case. Her description relies on legal precedents that focus on issues of ballot placement and of 19 whether a state is obligated to provide Voters the means to cast Write-In

- 1 Votes. In Plaintiff's Case, Plaintiff exercised state-provided means to cast a
- Write-In Vote for himself, so the most relevant precedents on this matter
- are Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws, 878
- 4 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989) and Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Both of
- these precedents support Plaintiff's assertion that, upon the State of
- 6 California providing him with the means to cast a Write-In Vote and upon
- him exercising said means to cast a Write-In Vote for his own Candidacy,
- 8 the State of California is then subsequently obligated to treat his ALREADY
- 9 CAST Write-In Vote equally as it would treat a Vote cast for a Ballot-listed
- 10 Candidate.
- On page 5, lines 17 to 19, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge's quotation
- of outdated Case Law in stating that "[N]o bright line separates permissible
- election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements", as the
- Bush v. Gore Uniformity Principle clearly establishes a "bright line" that
- prohibits unequal treatment of Votes cast in the same election. As Plaintiff's
- Write-In Vote was cast using state-provided means and reasonably in
- accordance with the instruction provided to him at the time of voting, the
- 18 Court must apply this "bright line" to Plaintiff's Case.

- On page 6, lines 3 to 16, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge's implication
- that by refusing to provide fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths from
- electors, he made no effort to secure said oaths. He did in fact use Social
- 4 Media, the best means available to him, to attempt to find such electors;
- 5 however, he received no support. Given the extreme and severe logistical
- 6 coordination necessary to obtain a NOTARIZED oath, in addition to the
- <sup>7</sup> substantial monetary burden of NOTARIZING the signatures for said oaths,
- 8 Plaintiff subsequently determined that the State of California's requirement
- 9 for fifty-five (55) oaths does in fact significantly impair access to the ballot,
- as it precludes poor people like himself from using Write-In Voting to
- challenge the political establishment. Simply put, a Candidate cannot run
- as a Write-In Candidate nationwide without spending thousands of dollars
- in NOTARIZATION FEES. These notarization fees serve as implicit filing
- 14 fees and should be prohibited according to the precedent set in Dixon v.
- Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th
- 16 Cir. 1989).
- On page 6, line 17, to page 7, line 6, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge's
- 18 finding that the burden inflicted upon Plaintiff by California Elections Code
- §§ 8600-8606 and 8650-8653 is not severe. In making this determination,

- Magistrate Judge supports this determination by offering inaccurate
- 2 analysis of Plaintiff's Case, including:
- 1) Implying Plaintiff failed to make any effort to fulfill the State of
  California's requirements for Write In Voters (see Exhibits BC through BH);
  - Applying wrong, irrelevant precedents addressing signature requirements for ballot placement, which do NOT require notarization and are so much easier to achieve;
  - 3) Failing to take into account that signature requirements can be met simply by obtaining signatures from complete strangers during chance encounters, while the ACTUAL requirement inflicted upon Plaintiff requires NOTARIZATION, which is impossible to achieve in such a casual manner and requires significant advance coordination with the signer to achieve;
  - 4) Failing to acknowledge that the monetary costs for notarizing fiftyfive signatures can easily accrue into the thousands of dollars, an amount which is unbearable to Plaintiff, as proven by his IFP status, and so much be construed as severe upon plaintiff;
  - 5) Failing to acknowledge that based on the potentially inflammatory message of Plaintiff's campaign that "AFDC created the Middle

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Class", combined with the likelihood that his Social Media posts are actively suppressed (see Exhibits BE through BH), the burden to Plaintiff's particular Candidacy is even more severe than the burden to the average Write-In Candidate, as his Candidacy directly meets the rationale provided for the existence of the standard of Strict Scrutiny established in the famous Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); and

- 6) Failing to acknowledge the burden imposed UPON the VOTER by the State of California's requirements for Write-In Candidates is SEVERE, as in the process of casting a Write-In Vote, the Voter is simply instructed to cast such a Vote for a "qualified write-in candidate", which reasonably implies a Candidate qualified under the U.S. Constitution, which is a standard that Plaintiff and many other Write-In Candidates obviously meet.
- On page 7, lines 15 to 17, Plaintiff again objects to Magistrate Judge's
  finding that the burden imposed upon Plaintiff, both as a Candidate and as
  a Voter, by the State of California's requirements for notarized sworn oaths
  is "less-than-severe". Plaintiff uses the same rationale stated in his
  previous objection to make this objection.

- On page 7, lines 19 to 21, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge conflating
- requirements for ballot placement, where the Candidate's name appears
- directly on the ballot, with requirements for Write-In Voting, where the Voter
- 4 enters the Candidate's name at the time said Voter casts a Vote.
- 5 On page 7, lines 21 to 24, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge raising the
- issue of "number of candidates on the ballot", as Plaintiff is NOT seeking to
- 7 appear in the listing of candidates directly printed on the ballot.
- 8 On page 7, lines 24 to 27, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge raising the
- 9 issue of "expense and burden of runoff elections", as runoff elections are
- wholly irrelevant to Plaintiff's Claim. Furthermore, the Court has already
- decided in Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws,
- 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989) that the value of counting and reporting Write-
- In Votes outweighs the cost of doing so incurred by the state, and so
- ordered the counting and reporting of Write-In Votes.
- On page 7, line 27, to page 8, line 2, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge
- implying that the "legislatively-expressed will of its people" (meaning the
- actions of a state legislature) is more important that the ACTUALLY &
- DIRECTLY expressed will of its people who choose to cast Write-In Votes
- using state-provided means. By prioritizing the "legislatively-expressed will"

- to invalidate Plaintiff's Claim, Magistrate Judge forecloses the possibility of
- dissident expression that was found to be of essential importance in Dixon
- 3 v. Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th
- 4 Cir. 1989).
- 5 On page 8, lines 8 to 19, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge's finding that
- the balance of interests in Plaintiff's Case favors the regulatory interests of
- the State of California because the State's requirements for Write-In
- 8 Candidates are "reasonable", "less onerous" than signature requirements
- 9 for ballot placement, and non-discriminatory. As Plaintiff has explained,
- Magistrate Judge's analysis relies on her faulty analogy between signature
- requirements for ballot placement and requirements for NOTARIZED sworn
- oaths for Write-In Candidates. Due to the immense cost and logistical
- hurdles involved in obtaining fifty-five (55) NOTARIZED sworn oaths, it is
- unreasonable to expect a Poor Person, such as Plaintiff, to be able to fulfill
- such a requirement. Therefore, this requirement is highly discriminatory
- against Poor People and substantially more onerous than a requirement for
- simple signatures from registered Voters would be. Additionally, since it is
- the Voter who chooses to Write-In a Candidate's name, this requirement
- actually serves as a means of suppressing the will of Poor Voters, as even
- if a large group of Poor Voters banded together to support a common

- Write-In Candidate from within their group, this discriminatory requirement
- would likely preclude their Votes from ever being counted or reported. This
- 3 situation is the antithesis of real Democracy. Furthermore, this requirement
- 4 is even harsher and more severe to Plaintiff's specific Campaign on behalf
- of Poor People, due to the aforementioned possibility that his Campaign
- 6 messages about the interests of Poor People in regards to the 1996
- 7 Welfare Reform may have been actively suppressed by various Social
- 8 Media platforms.
- 9 On page 8, lines 16 to 19, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge's assertion
- that "plaintiff's claims are without legal merit", that his Case should be
- "dismissed with prejudice", and that "amendment would be futile". In prior
- objections, Plaintiff has explained how the bulk of Magistrate Judge's
- analysis is based on two critically flawed analogies, namely: 1) her analogy
- between signature requirements and requirements for NOTARIZED sworn
- oaths and 2) her analogy between regulation of ballot placement and
- regulation of ALREADY CAST Write-In Votes. In offering these fatally
- 17 flawed analogies and in failing to take into account the specifics of
- Plaintiff's Case in determining matters of severity of burden and worthiness
- 19 for Strict Scrutiny, and particularly in failing to acknowledge that his main
- 20 Campaign message advocating for the repeal of the 1996 Welfare Reform

- is in fact an effort to repeal undesirable legislation targeting a discrete and
- insular minority (i.e. Poor People), Magistrate Judge fails to provide a
- 3 convincing rationale for her findings and recommendations, so the Court
- 4 must conclude that these findings and recommendations lack the basis in
- fact required for the Court to accept them. Additionally, without Magistrate
- 6 Judge offering a specific example of how Plaintiff should amend his claim, it
- is impossible to determine whether amendment is even necessary, so for
- 8 her to state that amendment is "futile" is premature.
- 9 On page 8, lines 20 to 25, Plaintiff objects to each of Magistrate Judge's
- two recommendations to the Court. Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the
- recommendation to dismiss his Case with prejudice and close his Case, as
- 12 Plaintiff has demonstrated numerous irreparable flaws in Magistrate
- Judge's analysis that led to these findings and recommendations.
- On page 8, line 27, to page 9, line to 6, Plaintiff objects to the application of
- the standard fourteen day deadline to Pro Se parties, as it takes significant
- time and effort for a Pro Se party to research the matters necessary to
- 17 prepare objections.
- On page 8, lines 2 to 6, Plaintiff also objects to the implicit fee imposed on
- a party proceeding in Forma Pauperis by requiring physical service to all

- parties, as Plaintiff was instructed by the Court's own Clerk's Office that the
- 2 U.S. Marshalls do NOT serve objections to findings and recommendations.

#### 3 V. OBJECTION TO DISMISSAL AND CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS

- 4 Plaintiff, by the aforementioned arguments, has proven the incontrovertible
- strength and merit of his Case, especially in regards to the question of
- 6 whether the State of California should be allowed to summarily discard
- 7 ALREADY CAST Write-In Votes that were cast in accordance with the
- 8 instructions printed on the Official State Ballots. He has also shown
- 9 numerous and substantial defects in Magistrate Judge's findings,
- recommendations, and overall reasoning process.
- Plaintiff does now object in the strongest possible terms to Magistrate
- Judge's recommendation to dismiss this Case with prejudice and close this
- 13 Case.
- 14 Under these conditions, if the Court were to dismiss and close Plaintiff's
- 15 Case, a case that centers on such pivotal matters as the right to Vote and
- the right to have one's Vote counted, such action would present such a
- grave miscarriage of justice as to lead a significant number of Voters to
- lose confidence in our justice system and electoral process, thus

- undermining, likely in a catastrophic manner, the Peoples' faith in the very
- 2 institutions upon which our Nation is built.
- 3 Simply put, if the Court does not find Plaintiff's Case worthy of a hearing
- and a decision, it is hard to imagine the Court ever finding ANY case raised
- 5 by ANY Write-In Candidate to be worthy of such consideration. And if
- 6 Write-In Candidates are summarily dismissed, then the right to cast a
- 7 Write-In Vote that is provided in a majority of States becomes not a right at
- 8 all. Instead, it becomes a means to cheat the least educated and/or
- 9 knowledgeable portion of the population out of their voting rights. It
- becomes organized voter suppression.
- If the Court wishes to make itself a party to such a situation, Plaintiff has
- little recourse to prevent that outcome. Still, Plaintiff views it as his civic
- duty to warn the Court in advance of such a choice, so that the Court
- makes its choice explicitly, not accidentally or by lack of awareness of said
- 15 choice.
- To this end, Plaintiff again notes that this Case deserves a decision from
- the Court and Plaintiff asks the Court as emphatically as possible to set
- aside Magistrate Judge's recommendations for dismissal and closure, and
- instead to commit to issuing a decision on this Case.

#### 1 VI. PROPOSED REMEDY

- Plaintiff asserts that, upon reviewing the whole body of flaws and errors in
- 3 Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendation enumerated in this
- 4 document, the Court must completely and fully DISREGARD Magistrate
- 5 Judge's specific recommendations that "1. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1)
- 6 be DISMISSED with prejudice; and 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to
- 7 close this case."
- 8 Additionally, to REMEDY the status of this Case, Plaintiff requests that, in
- 9 addition to disregarding Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations,
- 10 that the Court also:
- If the Court finds need for Plaintiff to amend his original Complaint,
   that the Court grants Plaintiff reasonable leave to do so;
- 2. Upon such amendment having been found either unnecessary or complete, order Plaintiff to serve Defendant with the Complaint for this Case; and
- 3. Note that, in all matters where Plaintiff has a choice to proceed under

  Magistrate Judge or District Court Judge, Plaintiff hereby registers his

  uniform preference to proceed under District Court Judge.

#### 1 VII. DESCRIPTION OF ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS

- 2 Plaintiff now offers the Court additional exhibits relevant to points made in
- this document. Plaintiff provides these additional exhibits starting from the
- 4 sequence number "Exhibit BA" so as to maintain sequential ordering with
- the set of exhibits that he previously filed with his original Complaint for this
- 6 Case. Also, Plaintiff provides URLs to access the information for each
- 7 exhibit via the internet. Specifically, Plaintiff provides the URL of the original
- source (i.e. Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, etc.), as well as the URL of a
- 9 permanent archived version of said source. The archived versions are
- permanently stored in the internet archive located at
- "https://web.archive.org/", and can be accessed via this site's internal
- search engine (branded under the name "The Wayback Machine").
- 13 Exhibit BA shows a web post from San Diego Notary Now explaining that
- the maximum notarization fee for the State of California was increased from
- \$10 to \$15 per signature on January 1, 2017. Additionally, the post explains
- that customers should expect all notaries to charge this maximum fee as
- their fee per signature.
- 18 URLs: https://sandiegonotarynow.com/2016/12/notary-fee-increase-california-maximum-per-signature-fee/
- 19 https://web.archive.org/web/20201019161513/https://sandiegonotarynow.com/2016/12/notary-fee-increase-california-
- 20 maximum-per-signature-fee/

- Exhibit BB shows the National Notary Associations table of standard 2020 1
- 2 notarization fees for various states, showing that for California the standard
- fee was \$15 per signature. 3
- 4 URLs: https://www.nationalnotary.org/knowledge-center/about-notaries/notary-fees-by-state
- 5 https://web.archive.org/web/20210126045427/https://www.nationalnotary.org/knowledge-center/about-
- notaries/notary-fees-by-state
- **Exhibit BC** depicts how, on September 14, 2020, Mr. Ehrenreich posted 7
- his request for fifty-five (55) users who reside in the State of California to 8
- serve as electors for his campaign to Twitter. 9
- 10 URLs: https://twitter.com/rehrenreich/status/1305430684836663296
- 11 https://web.archive.org/web/20200914085843/https://twitter.com/rehrenreich/status/1305430684836663296
- **Exhibit BD** depicts how, on September 15, 2020, Mr. Ehrenreich posted 12
- his request for fifty-five (55) users who reside in the State of California to 13
- serve as electors for his campaign to the Ryan 4 Prez Facebook page. 14
- Additionally, Mr. Ehrenreich shared this post to his personal network. 15
- 16 URLs: https://www.facebook.com/Ryan4Prez/posts/2646441442248406,
- 17 https://web.archive.org/web/20201120082217/https://www.facebook.com/Ryan4Prez/posts/2646441442248406
- **Exhibit BE** depicts a September 16, 2020 Reddit post by Mr. Ehrenreich 18
- on the topic of what created the Middle Class that he attempted to use to 19
- generate interest for his candidacy on Reddit. This image shows how he 20
- sees the post when he is logged-in to his own account. 21
- 22 URLs: https://www.reddit.com/r/Libertarian/comments/itrh1u/what\_actually\_created\_the\_middle\_class/


- **Exhibit BF** depicts a September 16, 2020 Reddit post by Mr. Ehrenreich
- on the topic of what created the Middle Class that he attempted to use to
- 3 generate interest for his candidacy on Reddit. This image shows how he
- 4 sees the post anonymously (i.e. when he is NOT logged-in to his own
- 5 account).
- 6 URLs: https://www.reddit.com/r/Libertarian/comments/itrh1u/what\_actually\_created\_the\_middle\_class/,
- 7 https://web.archive.org/web/20201112201910/https://www.reddit.com/r/Libertarian/comments/itrh1u/what\_actually\_cr
- 8 eated\_the\_middle\_class/
- 9 **Exhibit BG** depicts a September 17, 2020 Reddit post by Mr. Ehrenreich
- on the topic of Price Supports that he attempted to use to generate interest
- for his candidacy on Reddit. This image shows how he sees the post when
- he is logged-in to his own account.
- 13 URLs: https://www.reddit.com/r/Libertarian/comments/iup403/what\_is\_the\_official\_libertarian\_position\_on/
- **Exhibit BH** depicts a September 17, 2020 Reddit post by Mr. Ehrenreich
- on the topic of Price Supports that he attempted to use to generate interest
- for his candidacy on Reddit. This image shows how he sees the post
- anonymously (i.e. when he is NOT logged-in to his own account).
- 18 URLs: https://www.reddit.com/r/Libertarian/comments/iup403/what\_is\_the\_official\_libertarian\_position\_on/,
- 19 https://web.archive.org/web/20201112202233if\_/https://www.reddit.com/r/Libertarian/comments/iup403/what\_is\_the\_
- 20 official\_libertarian\_position\_on/

- Exhibit BI shows the design of the State of Hawaii's 2016 General Election
- 2 Ballot, which clearly does NOT include any fields for Voters to cast Write-In
- з Votes.
- 4 URLs: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-465/141109/20200408124811883\_19-
- 5 465%20Amicus%20Appendix.pdf,
- 6 https://web.archive.org/web/20201104103624/https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-
- 7 465/141109/20200408124811883\_19-465%20Amicus%20Appendix.pdf


#### 8 VIII. ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS

- 9 Plaintiff provides the exhibits corresponding to the above descriptions as
- 10 follows:


# 1 Exhibit BA.




## 1 Exhibit BB.




### 1 Exhibit BC.




## 1 Exhibit BD.



## Exhibit BE.




## 1 Exhibit BF.




# Exhibit BG.



## 1 Exhibit BH.



#### Exhibit Bl.



# IX. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

#### Cases

1

3	Blankenship v. Newsom, No. 20-CV-04479-RS, 2020 WL 6589654, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3,	
4	2020)	27
5	Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1991)	13
6	Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989	)
7	pa	assim
8	Dole v. Local Union 317, 711 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala. 1989)	17
9	Hendon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 633 F. Supp. 454 (W.D.N.C. 1986)	14
10	United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938)29, 3	1, 39
11	Statutes	
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12 13	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)	
	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)	assim
13	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)	assim 19
13 14	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)	assim 19 .9, 21

#### X. CONCLUSION 1

- Plaintiff does hereby object in the strongest possible terms to the whole 2
- body of findings and recommendations issued by Magistrate Judge on this 3
- Case for the numerous reasons stated above. 4
- Also, Plaintiff does hereby request the Court enact his Proposed Remedy 5
- as soon as possible, so as to move this Case forward to a decision and a 6
- resolution on the matters contained therein. 7
- Finally, Plaintiff does hereby affirm that the statements and exhibits listed 8
- above are true to fact as described and depicted. 9

DATED: February 4, 2021 11

12

By: Ryan Ehrenseich

Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich 13

Plaintiff in Pro Per 14

	POS-030
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address):  Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich	FOR COURT USE ONLY
6241 Freedom Lane Citrus Heights, CA 95621	
Tollius Heighis, OA 93021	
TELEPHONE NO.: 916-334-1413 FAX NO. (Optional):	
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): ryanse@gmail.com ATTORNEY FOR (Name):	
U.S. DISTRICT COURT for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Divis	sion
STREET ADDRESS: Robert T. Matsui Federal Courthouse	Sion
MAILING ADDRESS: 501   Street, Room 4-200	
CITY AND ZIP CODE: Sacramento, CA 95814	
BRANCH NAME:	
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich	
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Alex Padilla	
PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL	CASE NUMBER: 2:20-cv-02422-JAM-CKD (PS)
(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a	Summons and Complaint.)
<ol> <li>I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or took place.</li> </ol>	employed in the county where the mailing
My residence or business address is:     Kevan Ehrenreich	
6241 Freedom Lane Citrus Heights, CA 95621	
<ol> <li>On (date): February 4, 2021 I mailed from (city and state): Sacramen the following documents (specify):</li> </ol>	
* Plaintiff's OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS AND RECO * Copy of PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL-CIVIL (POS-030)	MMENDATIONS
The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-C (form POS-030(D)).	Class Mail—Civil (Documents Served)
4. I served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one):	
a. x depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service	e with the postage fully prepaid.
b. placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary	, , ,
business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.	mailing. On the same day that correspondence is
5. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:	
a. Name of person served: Alex Padilla	
b. Address of person served: Secretary of State Alex Padilla	
1500 11th Street Sacramento, CA 95814	
The name and address of each person to whom I mailed the documents i by First-Class Mail—Civil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).	is listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the	foregoing is true and correct.
Date: February 4, 2021	
Kevan Ehrenreich	
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)	(SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)

	POS-03
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address):  Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich	FOR COURT USE ONLY
6241 Freedom Lane	
Citrus Heights, CA 95621	
TELEPHONE NO.: 916-334-1413 FAX NO. (Optional):	
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): ryanse@gmail.com	
ATTORNEY FOR (Name):	
U.S. DISTRICT COURT for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division	
STREET ADDRESS: Robert T. Matsui Federal Courthouse	
MAILING ADDRESS: 501   Street, Room 4-200	
crty and zip code: Sacramento, CA 95814	
BRANCH NAME:	4
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: Ryan Stephen Ehrenreich	
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Alex Padilla	
PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL	CASE NUMBER:   2:20-cv-02422-JAM-CKD (PS)
(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summ	ons and Complaint.)
<ol> <li>I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employ took place.</li> </ol>	red in the county where the mailing
2. My residence or business address is:  Kevan Ehrenreich 6241 Freedom Lane Citrus Heights, CA 95621	
Onlds Heights, OA 9002 F	
<ul> <li>On (date): February 4, 2021 I mailed from (city and state): Sacramento, CA the following documents (specify):</li> <li>Plaintiff's OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINDINGS AND RECOMMEN</li> <li>Copy of PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAILCIVIL (POS-030)</li> </ul>	DATIONS
The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class Months (form POS-030(D)).	ail—Civil (Documents Served)
4. I served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one):	
a. x depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the	ne postage fully prepaid.
b. placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary busines business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing	ss practices. I am readily familiar with this
placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of bus a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.	
5. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:	
a. Name of person served: Alex Padilla	
b. Address of person served: Secretary of State Alex Padilla 501 I Street Suite 7-800 Sacramento, CA 95814	
The name and address of each person to whom I mailed the documents is listed by First-Class Mail—Civil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).	in the Attachment to Proof of Service
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoi	ng is true and correct.
Date: February 4, 2021	
Kevan Ehrenreich	
CTYPE OF PRINT NAME OF PEOPON COMOLETING THIS FORM	NATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)